Nude, Glorious, Living by Robert, William
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Religion College of Arts and Sciences 
2013 
Nude, Glorious, Living 
William Robert 
Syracuse University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/rel 
 Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, and the Religion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William Robert. "Nude, Glorious, Living" Political Theology 14.1 (2013): 115-130. Available at: 
http://works.bepress.com/william_robert/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at SURFACE. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Religion by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact 
surface@syr.edu. 
[PT 14.1 (2013) 115-130] Political Theology (print) ISSN 1462-317X
doi:10.1558/poth.v14i1.115 Political Theology (online) ISSN 1743-1719








Keywords: Agamben; economy; glory.
With Giorgio Agamben, glory is nude. It is denuded, revealed—as are 
imbricated possibilities of life and political theology, insofar as Agamben 
locates glory as “precisely the place at which this bilateral (or bi-univocal) 
character of the relation between theology and politics clearly emerges 
into the light.”2 When glory “emerges into the light” through Agamben’s 
The Kingdom and the Glory, it reveals that it, like the fabled emperor, has 
no clothes. Glory ceremoniously parades denuded, in absent or invisible 
clothes, with Agamben cast (or casting himself) as the fabular child who 
exclaims, “But he hasn’t got anything on.”3
1. William Robert is Assistant Professor of Religion at Syracuse University. He is the 
author of Trials: Of Antigone and Jesus.
2. Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Econ-
omy and Government (Homo Sacer II, 2), trans. Lorenzo Chiesa with Matteo Mandarini 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 193. In a related vein, Joshua Dubler 
writes that “if not a substance, power might be said to possess a currency. That cur-
rency is glory”—and “no gold standard props up this currency.” See Dubler’s contribu-
tion to the Agamben Symposium, available at http://www.politicaltheology.com/blog/
agamben-symposium-joshua-dubler.
3. Hans Christian Andersen, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” trans. Jean Her-
sholt, The Hans Christian Andersen Center, http://www.andersen.sdu.dk/vaerk/hersholt/
TheEmperorsNewClothes_e.html. This story concludes with “the whole town” reiterat-
ing the little child’s proclamation, after which “the Emperor shivered, for he suspected they 
were right. But he thought, ‘This procession has got to go on.’ So he walked more proudly 
than ever, as his noblemen held high the train that wasn’t there at all.”
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Nude
Nudity is nothing new for Agamben.4 Forms of nudity and processes of 
denuding mark Agamben’s philosophical oeuvre, particularly his Homo 
Sacer project, from its inceptional treatment of life in this project’s inau-
gural volume (Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life) through its subse-
quent volumes’ considerations of paradigms that include the witness, the 
Musselmann, the state of exception, the monastic rule, the oath, testimony, 
liturgy—and glory. Agamben’s archaeological investigations successively 
denude these figures as part of his project’s ultimate denuding of life, the 
vital subject at this project’s heart. He manifests (and implicitly explains) 
this attentiveness to life in articulating a programmatic direction for what 
he, following Walter Benjamin, calls “the coming philosophy,” in which
it will be necessary, moreover, to embark on a genealogical inquiry into the 
term “life.” This inquiry, we may already state, will demonstrate that “life” 
is not a medical and scientific notion but a philosophical, political and theo-
logical concept, and that many of the categories of our philosophical tradi-
tion must therefore be rethought accordingly. In this dimension, there will 
be little sense in distinguishing between organic life and animal life or even 
between biological life and contemplative life and between nuda vita and the 
life of the mind.5 Life as contemplation without knowledge will have a pre-
cise correlate in thought that has freed itself of all cognition and intention-
ality. Theōria and the contemplative life, which the philosophical tradition 
has identified as its highest goal for centuries, will have to be dislocated onto 
a new plane of immanence. It is not certain that, in the process, political 
4. Nor is nudity new for political theology. A genealogical (or, following Agam-
ben, an archaeological) investigation of political theology could demonstrate this sugges-
tion by, for example, attending to Carl Schmitt’s key claim that “all significant concepts of 
the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts” as a denuding of sec-
ularization’s effects on political theoretical concepts, which reveals them to be theological. 
See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George 
Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 36. I mention Schmitt given the sig-
nificance of his political theology for Agamben’s, though space prevents me from develop-
ing this point further, in and through Schmitt’s and others’ writings.
5. Daniel Heller-Roazen’s translation of nuda vita as “bare life” in Homo Sacer has 
become standard, though other translators, such as Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino, 
instead translate nuda vita as “naked life.” See Giorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on 
Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 2000), esp. 143 n. 1. But “naked life” still blurs important conceptual distinctions 
between nakedness and nudity (some of which I articulate in what follows); so to avoid this 
blurring and to maintain the etymological kinship of nuda vita and nudità [nudity], I have 
left nuda vita untranslated throughout and have modified existing translations accordingly. 
For a brief account of Agamben’s nuda vita as a translation of Walter Benjamin’s das bloße 
Leben (which Agamben cites on page 65 of Homo Sacer), see Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio 
Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 202–3.
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philosophy and epistemology will be able to maintain their present physiog-
nomy and difference with respect to ontology. Today, blessed life lies on the 
same terrain as the biological body of the West.6
This passage presciently delineates the contours of his Homo Sacer proj-
ect, as it advances from biopolitics toward glory. This project takes place, 
I suggest, in and through a method of denuding and a mechanism of 
inoperativity—and with life as its ultimate subject, from which the possi-
bility and shape of his political theology remain inextricable. In this way, 
Agamben displays himself via his Homo Sacer project as a thinker of nudity, 
with this project a thinking of and through nudity, which for him serves as 
a paradigm, tied to a signature, which designates an apparatus and effects a 
production. Hence attending to glory and life take place by way of nudity, 
to which I turn.
In naming nudity as a paradigm, Agamben echoes François Jullien’s 
assertion that nudity designates “a paradigm of what the ‘West’ consists 
of in cultural terms and brings to light the stances that originally under-
pinned our philosophy,” addressing “the question of essence, of the ‘thing 
itself,’” which “brings into play that which is most direct—frontal—and 
most sensible, thus reopening and making us keenly sensitive to the pos-
sibilities of ontology.”7 Nudity, for Jullien as for Agamben, is a matter of 
ontology and, more specifically, of ontological exposure. In Agamben’s 
methodological lexicon, a paradigm (paradigma) names a form of knowl-
edge that neutralizes the generality–particularity dichotomy, instead pass-
ing from singularity to singularity according to a temporality that crosses 
6. Giorgio Agamben, “Absolute Immanence,” in Potentialities, ed. and trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 220–39 (239). For a help-
ful and concise summary of “life” in Agamben’s oeuvre, see Catherine Mills, “Life,” in The 
Agamben Dictionary, ed. Alex Murray and Jessica Whyte (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2011), 123–26. For readings of “life” in Agamben’s oeuvre, see David Kishik, The Power 
of Life: Agamben and the Coming Politics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), and 
Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli, eds, Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), esp. 109–242. I have previously considered “life,” 
particularly sacred life, vis-à-vis Agamben (and others) in “Human, Life, and Other Sacred 
Stuff,” Journal of Cultural and Religious Theory 10, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 64–80.
7. François Jullien, The Impossible Nude: Chinese Art and Western Aesthetics, trans. 
Maev de la Guardia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), vii. Jullien’s contextu-
alized assertion reiterates Agamben’s methodological insistence that “method shares with 
logic its inability to separate itself completely from its context.” See Giorgio Agamben, 
The Signature of All Things: On Method, trans. Luca D’Isanto with Kevin Attell (New York: 
Zone Books, 2009), 7. Moreover, each of the three conceptual figures to which this text 
attends—paradigm, signature, and archaeology—plays a decisive role in Agamben’s Homo 
Sacer project, particularly as it progresses, so that these roles are unmissable in The King-
dom and the Glory.
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diachrony and synchrony.8 A paradigm thus crosses inclusion (particu-
larity and diachrony) and exclusion (generality and synchrony), so that 
it expresses an ontological precarity of excluded inclusion, which allows 
nudity as a paradigm to be, as Agamben writes, “not separate from the 
thing: it is the thing itself.”9 But nudity “is the thing itself ” not as an onto-
logical purity but as what Agamben calls “the thing’s knowability (its 
nudity),” by which he means “nothing other than the giving of the thing 
over to knowledge, nothing other than the stripping off of the clothes that 
cover it.”10 This knowability involves, then, a process of denuding (“the 
stripping off of the clothes that cover it”) and donation (“the giving of the 
thing over to knowledge”).
Such donation illustrates nudity’s status as a signature (segnatura), which 
for Agamben designates “something that, in a sign or a concept, exceeds 
it to refer back to a specific interpretation or move it to another context,” 
producing an ontological displacement without a semantic revision—
“something that is inseparable from the sign yet irreducible to it,” some-
thing “that by persisting in a sign makes it efficacious and capable of 
action” and signification.11 This signification is semantic and ontological, 
insofar as a signature is, according to Agamben, “that which marks things 
at the level of their pure existence” and “dispose[s] it [a thing] toward rev-
elation and knowability.”12 Being—and with it, “the thing itself ”—is a sig-
nature, which it signs as haplōs or as nuda, for as Agamben writes, “nuda, 
in the syntagm nuda vita, corresponds to the Greek term haplōs, by which 
first philosophy defines pure being.”13 Being, signed nudity, exposes—or 
8. Giorgio Agamben, “What is a Paradigm?” in The Signature of All Things: On Method, 
trans. Luca D’Isanto with Kevin Attell (New York: Zone Books, 2009), 9–32 (31). For 
astute considerations of Agamben’s oeuvre in terms of paradigm, see Lorenzo Chiesa and 
Frank Ruda, “The Event of Language as Force of Life: Agamben’s Linguistic Vitalism,” 
Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 16, no. 3 (2011): 163–80. For a consider-
ation of paradigm in The Kingdom and the Glory, see Alberto Toscano, “Divine Manage-
ment: Critical Remarks on Giorgio Agamben’s The Kingdom and the Glory,” Angelaki 16, 
no. 3 (2011): 125–36. Adam Kotsko offers a response to Toscano’s critique in his contri-
bution to the Agamben Symposium, available at http://www.politicaltheology.com/blog/
agamben-symposium-adam-kotsko.
9. Giorgio Agamben, “Nudity,” in Nudities, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 55–90 (84). For one exploration of “the 
thing itself,” see Giorgio Agamben, “The Thing Itself,” in Potentialities, 27–38.
10. Agamben, “Nudity,” 84.
11. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 87; Giorgio Agamben, “Theory of Signa-
tures,” in The Signature of All Things, 33–80 (50).
12. Agamben, “Theory of Signatures,” 66, 68; see also 43 and 61.
13. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 182 (translation modified). The 
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disposes—the potentiality for revelation and knowability (“not the thing 
but the thing’s knowability”).
This exposing disposition points to nudity as an apparatus, or dispositif, 
whose etymological ancestor, dispositio, served early Christians as a trans-
lation of oikonomia. Agamben transposes “apparatus” from its Foucaultian 
sense, as “‘a set of strategies of the relations of force supporting, and sup-
ported by, certain types of knowledge’” (though with an eye toward the 
limits of these knowledges), into “anything that has in some way the capac-
ity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the 
gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings.”14 Agamben 
thus deploys an apparatus as part of a dialectic with two “classes”: living 
beings and apparatuses, whose interactions produce subjects as an effect 
of subjectivation. This dialectic pulses through and powers Agamben’s 
Homo Sacer project, from its initial iteration—according to which a living 
being (zōē) enters and is affected by an apparatus (the polis and its correla-
tive bios), the result of which is a subject or subjectivation (nuda vita)—to 
its subsequent iteration in The Kingdom and the Glory—according to which 
power (or, articulated in different terms, being) enters and is affected by 
oikonomia (or praxis), producing glory. In these instances, nudity performs 
as an apparatus that effects exposition and revelation. Nudity operates as 
an apparatus of denuding.
In this way, nudity illuminates its status not as an effect but as an 
event—and, in doing so, marks its difference from nakedness. To dem-
onstrate these points, I follow Agamben’s lead in returning (with a nod 
to Jullien) to a primal scene of Occidental nudity: Adam and Eve’s con-
sumption of forbidden fruit from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and 
Evil. (This return reiterates Agamben’s contention that “nudity, in our 
Italian here is “‘nuda,’ nel sintagma ‘nuda vita,’ corrisponde qui al termine greco haplōs, con cui la 
folosofia prima definisce l’essere pure.” See Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer: Il potere sovrano e la nuda 
vita I (Torino: Einaudi, 1995), 203. See also Agamben, “Theory of Signatures,” 66, where he 
writes that signatures are “that which marks things at the level of their pure existence. On 
haplōs, ‘pure being,’ is the archi-signator.” Carlo Salzani astutely unfolds this use of haplōs 
vis-à-vis being with respect to nudity and to homo sacer in “The Notion of Life in the Work 
of Agamben,” Comparative Literature and Culture 14, no. 1 (March 2012): 1–9.
14. Giorgio Agamben, “What is an Apparatus?” in What is an Apparatus? and Other 
Essays, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2009), 1–24 (2, 14). Agamben’s citation of Foucault comes from the latter’s “Confession 
of the Flesh,” in Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 194–
228 (196). That “apparatus” appears throughout The Kingdom and the Glory is unsurprising 
given that text’s preoccupation with oikonomia. For an insightful consideration of apparatus 
and life in Agamben’s work, see Timothy C. Campbell, Improper Life: Technology and Bio-
politics from Heidegger to Agamben (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), esp. 
42–64.
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culture, is inseparable from a theological signature.”15) After recognizing 
their transgressions, “the eyes of both of them were opened, and they per-
ceived that they were naked; and they sewed together fig leaves and made 
themselves loincloths.”16 (Nudity is, again, a matter of epistemology as 
well as of ontology and theology.) What Adam and Eve perceive, phenom-
enologically and morally, is their nakedness. Nakedness, Elizabeth Grosz 
explains, “is a state of vulnerability” to the elements and “to the affect and 
the impact of the other.”17 This vulnerability owes to nakedness’s involv-
ing, as Jullien describes, “a diminished state, being stripped, laid bare”—
in other words, denuded.18
Nudity as paradigm makes nakedness knowable through a withdrawal, 
through “the stripping off of the clothes that cover it.”19 For Adam and Eve, 
these clothes were invisible garments of glory, whose withdrawal exposes 
what Agamben calls “the ‘naked corporeality’ of the first couple.”20 Nudity 
as signature effects their revealed state and nakedness’s phenomenologi-
cal and moral significations as “being stripped, laid bare” in both regis-
ters, which leads to their desire for and fabrication of loincloths from fig 
15. Agamben, “Nudity,” 57.
16. Genesis 3:7. For insightful reflections on ways in which conceptions of gender 
inform readings of this scene—and constructions of nakedness—particularly in Christian 
contexts, see Margaret R. Miles, Carnal Knowing: Female Nakedness and Religious Meaning in 
the Christian West (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989).
17. Elizabeth Grosz, “Naked,” in Encounters with Alphonso Lingis, ed. Alexander E. 
Hooke and Wolfgang W. Fuchs (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003), 119–32 (125).
18. Jullien, The Impossible Nude, 4.
19. Agamben, “Nudity,” 84.
20. Agamben, “Nudity,” 60; see also 57. This movement of withdrawal and discovery 
effects an unconcealment, or what Martin Heidegger calls Unverborgenheit or alētheia. For 
expositions of unconcealment in Heidegger’s writings, see (among other texts) “The Ori-
gin of the Work of Art,” trans. Albert Hofstadter, and “The Question Concerning Technol-
ogy,” trans. William Lovitt, in Basic Writings, rev. edn, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 139–212 and 307–41, respectively. For Heidegger’s distinction 
between revelation (Offenbarung) and revealability (Offenbarkeit), see Martin Heidegger, 
“Phenomenology and Theology,” trans. James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo, in Pathmarks, 
ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 39–62. Jacques Der-
rida considers these terms in, for example, “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of 
‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone,” trans. Samuel Weber, in Religion, ed. Jacques Der-
rida and Gianni Vattimo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1–78. For supple-
mentary accounts of revelation, particularly vis-à-vis unveiling, see Jacques Derrida, “Of an 
Apocalyptic Tone Newly Adopted in Philosophy,” trans. John P. Leavey Jr., in Derrida and 
Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1992), 25–71, and “A Silkworm of One’s Own: Points of View Stitched on 
the Other Veil,” in Hélène Cixous and Jacques Derrida, Veils, trans. Geoffrey Bennington 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 17–108.
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leaves. Nudity as apparatus enacts these revelations by producing nudity 
as denuding. Nakedness is a state, one that a dynamic denuding reveals—a 
denuding that is nudity, for as Agamben avows, “nudity is not actually a 
state but rather an event,” one “that never reaches its completed form…
nudity is literally infinite: it never stops occurring,” so that “we can there-
fore experience nudity only as a denuding and a baring, never as a form 
and a stable possession.”21 In other words, there is no such thing as nudity. 
There is only denuding.
Nudity as denuding, then, is an eventive apparatus that effects. It effects, 
for example, an epistemic passage for Adam and Eve, for whom the knowl-
edge of their denuding is the knowledge of good and evil. As Agamben 
remarks, “the only content of their knowledge of good and evil is, there-
fore, nudity.”22 What they come to know is privative: that they have under-
gone a denuding, in which they have lost something (in their case, their 
garments of glory). That this knowledge is privative—that it is, as Agam-
ben describes, “devoid of content”—means that “it is not the knowledge 
of some thing but rather the knowledge of pure knowability. It means that 
to know nudity is not to know an object but only an absence of veils, only 
a possibility of knowing.”23 Nudity exposes knowability, and this expo-
sure exposes ontology, since as knowability (to recall Agamben’s words) 
“nudity is not separate from the thing: it is the thing itself,” which names 
not an ontologically pure object but an ontological exposure.24 As Agam-
ben writes, “to see a body naked means to perceive its pure knowability 
beyond every secret, beyond or before its objective predicates.”25 Denud-
ing thus exposes not an object of knowledge but a potentiality for knowing.
What denuding reveals is revealability, which is a potentiality—one that 
is never actualized and, so, never manifested in or as revelation. Reveal-
ability, Offenbarkeit, is included in revelation, Offenbarung, only via exclu-
sion, as a threshold through which revelation passes—but a threshold that 
never passes across itself. Hence nudity as denuding manifests not a pri-
vation, as does nakedness, but a plenitude of potentiality.26 What denuding 
21. Agamben, “Nudity,” 65. Denuding is an event that produces nudity by, Grosz 
writes, “suffusing the image of nakedness with a context, a purpose, and a possible signifi-
cation.” See Grosz, “Naked,” 127.
22. Agamben, “Nudity,” 81.
23. Agamben, “Nudity,” 81. In “The Notion of Life in the Work of Agamben,” 5, Sal-
zani explains that “the thing itself is the very medium of its knowability.”
24. Agamben, “Nudity,” 84.
25. Agamben, “Nudity,” 84, 81. See also Jullien, The Impossible Nude, 23, where he 
articulates nudity in terms of “the soaring or surging out indicated by the prefix ek—as it 
appears in ec-stasy or e-vidence,” so that nudity “exposes Being more completely.”
26. Grosz adds that nudity is produced “by suffusing the image of nakedness with a con-
text, a purpose, and a possible signification,” as does a signature. See Grosz, “Naked,” 127.
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exposes is an ontological potentiality that never happens but that makes 
happen. In revealing revealability, denuding exposes inoperativity—a 
signature that facilitates signification without itself signifying. Nudity 
exposes itself, in and as inoperativity.
Inoperativity (inoperosità) names for Agamben a “mode of potential-
ity that is not exhausted…in a transitus de potentia ad actum.”27 Imbricated 
in this potentiality is a potentiality not to: a non-passage. Inoperativity 
exposes itself as a désoeuvrement, or unworking, just as nudity exposes itself 
as a dénudement, or denuding. Nudity as denuding—what Agamben calls 
“a cipher of knowledge,” a making knowable and giving over to knowl-
edge or a “trembling that makes this body knowable but that remains, in 
itself, ungraspable”—inacts this inoperativity by remaining knowability 
that never becomes knowledge.28
Glorious
Glory, like nudity, exposes inoperativity. Glory as glorification, like nudity 
as denuding, exposes (ex-poses) an originary, biopolitical inoperativity, 
one with corporeal, political, and biological implications.29
Denuding effects this exposition by producing the glorious body, 
just as nuda vita produces the biopolitical body. (In these instances, pro-
duction names a revelation, an exposition, manifested by and manifest-
ing inoperativity.) A glorious body is like a dancer’s, whose movements 
have, Agamben writes, “neither aim nor necessity” but take place “only 
in order to exhibit…agility,” as a dancer “undoes and disorganizes the 
economy of corporeal movements to then rediscover them, at once intact 
and transfigured, in the choreography.”30 By dancing, a dancer unworks 
a corporeal economy of movements in which potentiality passes tele-
ologically into kinetic activity by frustrating this efficient teleology in 
favor of an inefficient exhibition of corporeal potentiality—of what a 
body can do.
27. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 62; see also 61, where Agamben discloses that “every-
thing depends on what is meant by ‘inoperativity’.” Durantaye describes inoperativity as 
“an ontological reflection on the modalities of being.” See Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 19, 
where he also traces inoperativity’s conceptual genealogy via Georges Bataille, Jean-Luc 
Nancy, Maurice Blanchot, and others.
28. Agamben, “Nudity,” 82, 84.
29. On a related point, see Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin 
Attell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 87, where Agamben announces “the 
inactivity [inoperosità] and désoeuvrement of the human and of the animal as the supreme and 
unsavable figure of life.”
30. Giorgio Agamben, “The Glorious Body,” in Nudities, 91–103 (96, 102).
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A dancer thus displaces a bodily organ from its efficient, teleologi-
cal operation (e.g., a foot from walking, a mouth from eating, etc.) by 
suspending—like a dancer’s body in midair—this “transitus de potentia ad 
actum.” Suspended, this organ acquires what Agamben describes as “an 
ostensive function,” one that displays this organ’s potentiality, for “what 
is dance other than the liberation of the body from its utilitarian move-
ments, the exhibition of gestures in their pure inoperativity?”31 Rendered 
ostensive rather than efficient, a body becomes revealed as a glorious body, 
which is, according to Agamben, “an ostensive body whose functions are 
not executed but rather displayed,” in their inoperative potentiality.32 A 
glorious body is, then, a body that displays the potentiality of its means as 
such without directing them toward teleological ends. Phrased differently, 
a glorious body is a body of means as ends rather than of means toward 
ends. It is, in Agamben’s words, a body “undone, rendered inoperative, 
liberated and suspended from its ‘economy,’” exposing and denudingly 
displaying its inoperativity.33
This display of inoperativity is an ostensive display that deactivates a 
body and, Agamben writes, in doing so “allows the very potentiality that 
has manifested itself in the act to appear.”34 It allows the very potentiality 
of this body to be revealed as potentiality via its inoperativity, its ostensive-
ness. This exposure of a glorious body’s ontological potentiality exposes 
its epistemological potentiality for knowability and disposes it toward new 
potentialities. As Agamben explains, “at stake here is the rendering inop-
erative of any activity directed toward an end in order to then dispose it 
toward a new use, one that does not abolish the old use but persists in it 
and exhibits it,” so that a body’s potentiality, exposed in and as inoperativ-
ity, “can now become the organ of a new possible use, the organ of a body 
whose organicity has been suspended and rendered inoperative”—which 
31. Agamben, “The Glorious Body,” 98; Giorgio Agamben, “Hunger of an Ox: Con-
siderations on the Sabbath, the Feast, and Inoperativity,” in Nudities, 104–12 (111). Agamben 
also considers dance in “Notes on Gesture,” in Means without End: Notes on Politics, trans. 
Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 
49–60. For readings of Agamben vis-à-vis dance, see David Kishik, The Power of Life: Agam-
ben and the Coming Politics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 27–32, and Bar-
bara Formis, “Dismantling Theatricality: Aesthetics of Bare Life,” in The Work of Giorgio 
Agamben: Law, Literature, Life, ed. Justin Clemens, Nicholas Heron and Alex Murray (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 181–92.
32. Agamben, “The Glorious Body,” 98.
33. Agamben, “Hunger of an Ox,” 111.
34. Agamben, “The Glorious Body,” 102. For a luminous example of a related revela-
tion (by way of Bill Brown’s “thing theory”) of glorious bodies, see Patricia Cox Miller, The 
Corporeal Imagination: Signifying the Holy in Late Ancient Christianity (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).
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is why “there is perhaps nothing more enigmatic than a glorious penis, 
nothing more spectral than a purely doxological vagina.”35 Consequently, 
Agamben writes, 
the body that contemplates and exhibits its potentiality through its ges-
tures enters a second, final nature (which is nothing other than the truth 
of its former nature). The glorious body is not some other body, more agile 
and beautiful, more luminous and spiritual; it is the body itself [the ‘thing 
itself ’], at the moment when inoperativity removes the spell from it and 
opens it up to a new possible common use.36
This new potential use is glorification, as the revelation of glory’s 
revealability via inoperativity. This process of exposing a body’s inopera-
tivity comes not through glory but through glorifying, as a denuding that 
eventively never fully or finally happens.
I have considered nudity and corporeality at such length tactically, to 
effect a denuding: of the logic of glory and the ana-logic of its inoper-
ativity, which is ultimately bound up with life. While Agamben names 
archaeology as The Kingdom and the Glory’s method, I maintain that this 
text’s effective method is, as it is throughout his Homo Sacer project, one 
of denuding. Hence the logic and ana-logic, the relations and activities, 
of glory and glorying correspond, vis-à-vis political theology, to those of 
nudity and denuding vis-à-vis corporeality—with the ultimate revelations 
of both (which in both cases are revelations of inoperativity) directed 
toward life.
As paradigm, signature and apparatus, glory unfolds as nudity does, 
passing from glory as seeming effect to “glorying” as event to glorifica-
tion as condition of possibility—as an inoperativity that produces glory. 
Agamben explicitly attends to and investigates glorification as a way of 
attending to operations of and relations between power and glory. Per-
haps he does so because, just as denuding reveals corporeal inoperativity, 
glorification reveals politico-theological inoperativity in and through kab-
hod, imaged as an empty throne, a hetoimasia tou thronou—or, perhaps, as a 
denuded emperor.
This empty throne recalls the mystical throne vision of Ezekiel, in 
which—following an incredible image sequence that illustrates what 
Agamben calls an “optical phenomenology of glory”—Ezekiel discloses 
that he has seen “something like a throne,” above which is “something 
35. Agamben, “The Glorious Body,” 102, 99.
36. Agamben, “The Glorious Body,” 103. Jean-Luc Nancy adds that “glory is the 
rhythm, or the plasticity” of this presentability that never finishes coming to presence. See 
Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2008), 65.
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that looked like fire,” with a “splendor all around. This was the appear-
ance of the likeness of the glory of the LORD.”37 Ezekiel does not see God 
(YHVH) but God’s glory (kabhod YHVH), which might here name the 
revealability of God, so that kabhod signals an inoperativity through which 
revelation may occur. Glory therefore remains unseen because it is unsee-
able, making Ezekiel’s not an empty vision but a vision of emptiness: a 
vision not of revelation but of revealability, of the inoperative condition of 
revelation’s possibility. Glory, Agamben writes, is “nothing but the splen-
dor that emanates from this emptiness, the inexhaustible kabhod that at 
once reveals and veils the central vacuity of the machine.”38
Agamben returns to this empty throne of revealability to name it as 
“not, therefore, a symbol of regality but of glory,” which “precedes the cre-
ation of the world and survives its end,” because glory “is in its innermost 
self-inoperativity and sabbatism,” so that “the apparatus of glory finds its 
perfect cipher in the majesty of the empty throne. Its purpose is to cap-
ture within the governmental machine [one whose center is empty] that 
unthinkable inoperativity—making it its internal motor—that constitutes 
the ultimate mystery of divinity.”39 Here Agamben reiterates, in terms of 
glory, the logic of nudity, which exposes inoperativity at its heart and as its 
motor. This inoperativity at the heart of and as the motor of glory is glori-
fication, its inoperatively inacting condition of possibility.
This revealing glorification occurs in and through liturgy, which 
short-circuits an efficient teleology in favor of an inoperative ostensive-
ness. Liturgy performs a displacement analogous to glory’s displace-
ment of corporeality, thanks to which a body becomes a glorious body of 
means whose ostentive actions reveal inactivated potentiality. (Christian 
Eucharistic liturgies exemplify this deactivating, ostensive displacement 
as bread and wine—food and drink whose ordinary telos is nutritive—
become, literally or symbolically, ciphers that are sabbatically exhib-
itive of divinity.) Liturgy, too, marshals and displays this potentiality, 
this inoperativity, to dispose actions—and their relations to language and 
power—as ostensive, acclamatory means, of which the doxological amen 
is, Agamben writes, “the acclamation par excellence” because as only a 
means of glorification, a word empty of signifying content, it exposes its 
37. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 204; Ezekiel 1:26-28. Agamben considers 
various iterations of kabhod YHVH in The Kingdom and the Glory, 197–213. In Giorgio Agam-
ben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993), esp. 79–83, and elsewhere, he obliquely considers “glory” via its kinship to the 
Kabbalistic figure of Shekhinah.
38. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 211.
39. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 245; see also xiii and 196. He articulates con-
nections of inoperativity and sabbatism more explicitly in “Hunger of an Ox.”
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exemplary inoperativity and, with it, the inoperativity of language glori-
ously displaced in and by liturgy.40
Liturgy, moreover, (in Agamben’s words) “survives only as doxology,” 
which is, “in the final instance, concerned with producing and augment-
ing glory.”41 Language rendered inoperative in and by liturgy—language 
rendered sheerly doxological—is language denuded, exposed as an “empty 
turning” of inoperativity, of potentiality, that inacts glory through itself as 
a means of glorification. Just as nudity is produced in and by denuding (in 
its inoperativity), so glory is produced in and by glorifying (in its inoper-
ativity)—by amen.
Liturgy’s doxological denuding of language exposes doxology as, in 
Agamben’s words, “the glorifying kabhod,” graphically represented by the 
empty throne, to which amen as glorification is productively addressed.42 
Returning to this empty throne as a politico-theological scene under-
scores the political and theological import of glorification as the inopera-
tive potentiality that produces glory.
Politically, glorification is the inoperativity that, Agamben describes, “is 
the political substance of the Occident, the glorious nutrient of power.”43 
Politics and power are thus denuded as doxological, driven by the inop-
erative mechanism of glorification that produces glory, which marks 
that opening through which political theology occurs. Glory marks the 
site where, in Agamben’s words, “they ‘exchange clothes,’” though this 
exchange is not with one another but of old clothes for new ones of glory 
that, like the emperor’s, denude and displace bodies and substances, poli-
tics and theology, via liturgy and glorification.
Theologically, glorification denudes divinity by exposing its depen-
dence on glorification. If glorification produces glory, then doxological 
acclamation as the event of glorification is, Agamben writes, “perhaps in 
some way a necessity part of the life of the divinity,” for “if glory is the 
very substance of God and the true sense of his economy, then it depends 
upon glorification in an essential manner.”44 That is, if glorification pro-
duces glory, and if glory is God’s substance, then God depends on glori-
fication, which is an acclamatory and denuding occurrence that denudes 
40. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 230. For quite different but astute reflections 
on liturgy, see Vincent W. Lloyd, The Problem with Grace: Reconfiguring Political Theology (Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 108–27, and Jean-Yves Lacoste, Experience and the 
Absolute: Disputed Questions on the Humanity of Man, trans. Mark Raftery-Skehan (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2004).
41. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 162, 229; see also 232.
42. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 213.
43. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 246.
44. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 221, 226.
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inoperativity at the heart of divinity. As Agamben articulates it, glorifica-
tion exposes that “behind or perhaps within glory lies divine inoperativity,” 
katapausis, which “is something that theology absolutely does not want to 
see, a nudity that must be covered by a garment of light at any cost.”45 This 
“garment of light” is precisely a garment of glory, since (in Agamben’s 
words) “glory is what must cover with its splendor the unaccountable fig-
ure of divine inoperativity.”46 But glory as garment is made of an invisible 
fabric, woven by the denuding, doxological hands of glorification.
Living
Glory reveals itself in and through the glorious body, via denuding, and in 
and through the empty throne (and what might be called the doxological 
body—the body that says amen), via glorification. Ultimately, glory reveals 
itself in and through life, which remains at the heart of Agamben’s Homo 
Sacer project. Beginning with the exposure of nuda vita and the produc-
tion of the biopolitical body, this project advances through the denuding, 
glorifying productions of the glorious, doxological body and the correla-
tive exposure of life, which as Agamben avows, “itself becomes a form in 
glory.”47 The biopolitico-theological revelations that begin with nuda vita 
finally unveil vita aeterna, or zōē ainōnios, as the ultimate inoperativity that 
manifests life’s revealability. In this way, biopolitics and political theology 
lead, on Agamben’s account, to eternal life.
Vita aeterna, or zōē ainōnios, responsively (or perhaps responsorially) 
reveals why power vitally needs a glorious inoperativity, so much that 
it inscribes this inoperativity at its empty center. Eternal life, Agamben 
explains, “is the name of this inoperative center of the human, of this 
political ‘substance’ of the Occident that the machine of the economy and 
of glory ceaselessly attempts to capture within itself.”48 This inoperative 
human center, which exposes human revealability, (in Agamben’s words) 
“lives only (its) livability… In this inoperativity, the life that we live is only 
the life through which we live; only our [potential] power of acting and 
living, our act-ability and our live-ability.”49 Life becomes sheer potential-
ity, an ability that does not pass into activity and thus remains eternally 
45. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 242, 221; see also 215, where Agamben writes 
that “the circularity of glory here attains its ontological formulation: becoming free for the 
glorification of God means to understand oneself as constituted, in one’s very being, by the 
glory with which we celebrate the glory that allows us to celebrate it.”
46. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 163.
47. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 249.
48. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 251; see also 247.
49. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 251.
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inoperative. Here life as live-ability, as vita aeterna—instead of naming a 
zone of indistinction between zōē and bios, as it does in nuda vita—is that 
through which, as Agamben describes, “the bios coincides with the zōē 
without remainder.”50 Life becomes a cipher of inoperativity through 
which living reveals itself as denuding, as glorification, as eternally inop-
erative potentiality.
The biopolitico-theological investigations of Agamben’s Homo Sacer 
project—and with them, possibilities for life and for political theology—
ultimately lead beyond or before life, to life as sheer livability, as eter-
nal denuding of a glorious inoperativity. Life becomes unlivable because 
it becomes only livable, disposed (like the glorious, doxological body) 
toward a new potential and, as Agamben writes, “dislocated onto a new 
plane of immanence.”51 This “new plane of immanence” is not biopolitical 
but ontological, not temporal but eternal, not living but livable, not real-
izable but purely potential. It is a plane of contemplation, of sabbatism, of 
opening and exposing without end.
In dislocating life onto a plane of contemplative inoperativity, this open-
ing, this revealability before or beyond revelation, that vita aeterna mani-
fests what Agamben designates “the essential function that the tradition 
of Western philosophy has assigned to contemplative life and to inopera-
tivity,” which is to render “the specific functions of the living inoperative” 
by serving as “the metaphysical operators of anthropogenesis, which by 
liberating the living man from his biological or social destiny assigns him 
to that indefinable dimension that we are accustomed to call ‘politics.’”52 
Contemplative inoperativity detaches life from biology and sociality, so 
that it becomes purely contemplative—like an empty throne, which is a 
vision of emptiness to gaze upon without seeing anything. Politics, too, 
becomes displaced onto the contemplative plane of inoperativity, ren-
dered ostensive, acclamatory and anagogic.
Life and politics become deactivated, denuded openings onto eter-
nity via vita aeterna, which points (in Agamben’s words) to “the dimen-
sion that the inoperativity of contemplation, by deactivating linguistic 
and corporeal, material and immaterial praxes, ceaselessly opens and 
assigns to the living.”53 Thanks to these deactivations, corporeal denu-
dation and linguistic glorification give way to ontological contemplation 
of livability. Contemplation is the ultimate revealability of inoperativity 
since it beholds inoperative revealability itself, in a sphere that opens onto 
50. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 251; see also 245, where Agamben describes 
life as “inoperative and without purpose.”
51. Agamben, “Absolute Immanence,” 239.
52. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 251.
53. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 251.
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eternity. Contemplation names that impossible praxis of sabbatical inop-
erativity in and through which “But he hasn’t got anything on” is not (or 
not only) denuding revelation but glorious acclamation of livability, for-
ever and ever, amen.
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